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evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In 
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reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. 
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performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset 
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1. Introduction 
Measuring investment manager skill and fund performance has been a topic of interest to 
academics dating back to the inception of the asset pricing literature. Since the early models of 
Jensen (1968), Sharpe (1966), and Treynor and Mazuy (1966), investment manager skill has 
been analyzed across two dimensions - asset selection and market timing. More recent work 
recognizes the dynamic and independent nature of both the asset selection and market timing 
dimensions of manager skill (Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburg, and Veldkamp, 2014). It need not 
follow that a manager skilled in one dimension is necessarily skilled in the other. Mutual fund 
managers can create shareholder value via either channel and evidence suggests they allocate 
effort and attention independently to each dimension across the business cycle. 
The self-reported value proposition of many hedge funds is to create alpha via asset 
selection skill while minimizing the exposure of the fund to systematic risk. 1 While an extensive 
literature examines the existence of asset selection skill in hedge fund managers, the second 
equally important systematic risk management skill (SRM) dimension has received relatively 
little attention.
2
 Despite their declared objective of low systematic risk, Patton (2009) reports that 
approximately one quarter of “market neutral” hedge funds exhibit significant exposure to 
systematic risk. Similarly, a series of papers report that a significant portion of the variability in 
hedge fund returns can be explained by common risk factors.
3
 These results suggest that akin to 
                                                          
1
 For example, Daniel Och, chairman and chief executive of Och-Ziff Capital Management, stated “Investors 
continue to actively seek access to investment managers that generate risk-adjusted returns which have a low 
correlation to the equity markets and consistently protect capital. We believe that this focus has led to increased 
allocations to the hedge fund industry in the first half of this year, and that this acceleration will continue,” quoted in 
Ahmed, Azam, “Och-Ziff Quarterly Earnings rise 19%”, New York Times, August 2, 2011. 
2
 See, for example, Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008), Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2014), Cao, Chen, Liang 
and Lo (2013) , Bali, Brown and Demirtas (2013), Ramadorai (2012) and Sun, Wang and Zheng (2012) among 
many other who examine hedge fund performance. We discuss the more limited hedge fund systematic risk 
literature in detail below. 
3
 See Avramov, Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2011), Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2001, 2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Bollen (2013). 
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market timing, maintaining low systematic risk is an acquired skill not common to all hedge fund 
managers. Our objective is to examine the existence of SRM skill in the hedge fund industry. 
We frame our analysis in the theoretical model of Titman and Tiu (2011) which can be 
viewed as a simplification of Treynor and Black (1973).
4
 In the model, the hedge fund manager 
must allocate assets to create a mean-variance efficient portfolio by combining three 
investments: a risk-free asset (rf), a publicly available index (F) and a proprietary strategy (A). 
The excess return to the portfolio is a function of the weight (w) placed on the index relative to 
the proprietary strategy given by R-rf = wA(A-rf) + wF(F-rf). Since the proprietary strategy 
consists of a long-short or similar strategy, its return is unrelated to the return of the publicly 
available index (Corr(A,F)=0). In the Titman and Tiu (2011) model, there is no distinction 
between the manager’s ability to select assets in the proprietary strategy and his ability to ensure 
that the strategy and the public index remain independent. Thus, more skilled managers allocate 
a greater proportion of fund assets to the proprietary strategy (wA > wF) and for these superior 
managers, low fund systematic risk arises indirectly via the allocation strategy. Specifically, 
superior funds are characterized as having low R
2
 values in the regression of fund return on 
proxies for systematic risk. 
In contrast, in this paper, we argue that managerial skill is multidimensional and 
inherently more complex. Specifically, we argue that managerial ability to maintain the 
independence condition (i.e. Corr(A,F)=0) is separate from asset selection ability. In other 
words, the skill to select assets that are under and over-valued is different from the skill of 
maintaining low systematic risk and anticipating market conditions that may disrupt the long-
short hedge. It is well understood that asset correlations vary over time and tend to increase in 
                                                          
4
 Model details appear in Appendix A. 
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times of stress in financial markets.
5
 Buraschi, Kosowski, and Trojani (2014) show that hedge 
funds that achieve low systematic risk via implementation of long-short and arbitrage strategies 
incur significant correlation risk, resulting in low ex-post portfolio diversification and hedge 
effectiveness.
6
 In a multi-dimensional covariance matrix, the effects of correlation shocks are not 
easily predicted. Hence, management of correlation risk entails broad reductions of portfolio 
reliance on long-short positions, with the potential of uncoupling the beta hedge. In this paper, 
we extend the analysis of Titman and Tiu (2011), allowing (and testing) for a separation in 
manager skill between asset selection and SRM. We analyze the prevalence and determinants of 
SRM skill and its consequences for fund performance and investor preferences. The typical 
definition of skill in the context of asset management is the ability, drawn from one’s knowledge, 
experience, and training, to persistently achieve excellence in performance. In the context of 
stock picking and market timing, skill is associated with persistence in fund alpha.
7
 In our 
setting, we associate SRM skill with persistence in low fund systematic risk.  
To measure hedge fund systematic risk, we utilize a novel measure motivated by 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) who analyze levels of world systematic risk across equity 
indexes for a broad sample of developed, emerging, and frontier countries. This approach has the 
advantage of enabling the joint consideration of a highly inclusive set of systematic risk factors 
within the confines of a limited number of degrees of freedom when estimating annual 
systematic risk with monthly fund returns. Specifically, we estimate the principal components 
(PC) of 251 assets and measure systematic risk as the R
2
 value from the regression of hedge fund 
returns on those PCs.  
                                                          
5
 See Bollerslev, Engle and Woolridge (1988), Jorion (2000), Moskowitz (2003) and Engle and Sheppard (2006), 
among others. 
6
 Buraschi et al. (2014) define correlation risk as the risk derived from unexpected changes in the correlation 
between the returns of different assets or asset classes. 
7
 See, for example, Berk and Binsbergen (2014). 
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We commence our analysis by examining how fund-level systematic risk exposure 
changes over time, both unconditionally, and conditional on market state. If systematic risk 
levels do not change over time or across the cross-section of funds, then an examination of 
persistence in systematic risk as a proxy for manager skill will be non-informative. Tracking the 
systematic risk quintile rank of each fund between years in a transition matrix, we find that on 
average, only 30% of funds remain in the same risk quintile over a two-year period. These results 
suggest that SRM skill, proxied by persistence in systematic risk, is a rare commodity processed 
by relatively few managers. Partitioning by market state, the levels of systematic risk and 
correlation risk both increase when markets weaken. However, the ability of fund managers to 
stay in their original quintile rankings does not appear to change across market states. 
How do managers influence the systematic risk exposure of their funds? The actual asset 
transactions of hedge funds are largely unobservable. Like all financial intermediaries, hedge 
funds are required to disclose long, equity positions to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) quarterly in Form 13-F. However, holdings are reported by investment company (not by 
fund) and holdings of other assets and short positions are not disclosed. Given these limitations, 
we therefore examine time variation in factor loadings, focusing on the broadly utilized Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Mapping factor loadings over two-year periods, we show that 
loading variability is greatest for the equity risk, size spread, bond risk and credit risk factors. 
The standard deviation of the loading on these factors is typically two to three times the standard 
deviation on the other three factors. In other words, on average, managers appear to adjust 
exposure to equity risk, size spread, bond risk, and credit risk factors when managing the 
systematic risk exposure of their funds. 
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Which manager and fund types possess greater SRM skill? We find that the determinants 
of SRM skill can be loosely grouped into three categories. First, manager education and 
experience are both related to systematic risk persistence. Funds managed by better-educated 
managers (proxied by SAT score) and managed by more experienced managers have higher 
SRM skill. Similarly, larger and older funds which likely attract better qualified managers 
typically have higher SRM skill. Second, systematic risk is sensitive to fund distress indicators. 
SRM skill is lower for fund managers who manage funds with low investor flows, poor 
performance, and greater performance volatility, both at the fund and style level. Finally, 
correlation risk and market conditions both significantly drive SRM. Higher SRM funds have 
significantly lower correlation risk. This relation is accentuated in periods of stress in financial 
markets when asset correlations are more likely to shift away from historical correlation patterns.  
How is SRM skill level related to fund performance? We initially relate alpha to systematic 
risk persistence, factor loading variability (to capture the magnitude of risk adjustment), 
correlation risk and controls. We find a weak positive relation (significantly weaker than 
documented in prior studies) between SRM skill and alpha, suggesting separation between the 
two skill sets. Low systematic risk does not appear to be associated with higher fund 
performance. We next partition the model by market state. If the two skills are inherently related, 
the relation between alpha and SRM should be reasonably time invariant. However, if the skills 
are separate, we should observe a variation in the relation across time. We find that a positive 
relation between SRM skill and alpha holds only in the strong market state (the relation is twice 
as strong). This result suggests that manager attention shifts from asset selection to SRM across 
the cycle. Low systematic risk is maintained in weak market states at the cost of alpha. In the 
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strong market state, managers allocate less attention to SRM and this re-allocation of attention 
results in significant alpha benefits.  
Finally, we examine if investors value SRM skill. To address this issue, we partition the 
model by manager skill (managers who persistently remain in the bottom quintile of systematic 
risk relative to managers for whom the systematic risk quintile rank changes in each period). 
This model addresses whether in aggregate, the active attention allocation by SRM skilled 
managers benefits investors. The explanatory power of SRM skill for alpha is thrice as large for 
high SRM skill managers. The net benefits of active SRM appear to accrue only to high skill 
managers. For low skill managers, the cost of SRM by adjusting factor loadings exceeds the 
benefit, on average, by 1,024 bps per annum. Turning to investor preferences, proxied by fund 
allocations, we find that investors appear to be unable to detect SRM skill or that it is of lower 
value relative to other fund factors. High SRM skill managers attract incrementally higher flow 
but this relation appears to arise due to asset selection skill as opposed to SRM skill. Flows to 
high SRM skill managers are significantly higher in the strong market state, suggesting investors 
are reacting to performance as opposed to rewarding low systematic risk in the weak market state 
when the systematic risk hedge is most valuable. 
 
2. Context 
2.1 Related Literature 
Recent studies have typically used either correlation or factor models to measure fund 
exposure to systematic risk. As an example of the first class, Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) 
suggest a measure of the distinctiveness of a fund’s investment strategy based on the correlation 
of returns between peer funds and find that funds with more distinct portfolios realize superior 
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performance. Among the second class, Fung and Hsieh (2004) develop a set of factors explaining 
hedge fund returns that subsequent papers have built on.
8
  
The closest studies to our research question offer differing conclusions. As previously 
discussed, Titman and Tiu (2011) argue that superior hedge fund managers possess the joint 
ability to select assets and maintain low systematic risk. Managers form portfolios by allocating 
assets between a proprietary strategy and a publicly available index. Skilled managers allocate a 
greater proportion of assets to the proprietary strategy, resulting in low systematic risk for these 
funds. Titman and Tiu (2011) empirically test this theoretical prediction by ranking funds on the 
R
2
 generated by regressing hedge fund returns on systematic factors and show that funds with 
low R
2
s have higher information ratios, Sharpe ratios, and alphas. In addition, controlling for past 
performance, funds in the lowest R
2
 quartile attract greater investment inflows and are able to 
charge higher fees. In sharp contrast, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2012) measure systematic risk 
as the standard deviation of residuals from factor models that include the Fama and French 
(1993), Carhart (1997), and Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors and show that systematic risk is 
positively related to the returns earned by the funds. Funds in the highest systematic risk quintile 
generate 6% higher average annual returns than funds in the lowest systematic risk quintile.  
Both papers draw their inferences from the average characteristics of funds in systematic 
risk-ranked portfolios, where portfolios are formed over either the entire history of the fund or a 
reduced timeframe. A noteworthy limitation of this analysis is its static dimension. As we discuss 
below, hedge fund systematic risk ranks are highly variable over time. In our sample, the 
systematic risk quintile rank for over 70% of the funds changes each year by at least one rank. 
This variability obscures inferences that can be drawn from average systematic risk estimates. 
                                                          
8
 See for example, Sadka, 2010, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2011, Bollen and Whaley, 2009, or Patton and 
Ramadorai, 2013. 
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We extend the analysis in these papers by focusing on persistence in systematic risk, as opposed 
to the transitory level, and allow for the separation of asset selection from SRM skill. 
 
2.2 Manager Incentives 
The self-stated mandates of Equity Hedge and Equity Market Neutral style hedge funds 
(EMN) are to minimize investor exposure to systematic factors.
9
 Hence, we use persistence in 
systematic risk as our proxy for risk management skill. However, managers face a series of 
conflicting incentives which interact to make low systematic risk targets less appealing. For 
example, maintaining persistently low systematic risk requires managers to forego market timing 
opportunities. It is well understood in the mutual fund literature that active fund managers tilt 
their portfolios toward high beta stocks during up markets to take advantage of the superior 
returns earned by high beta stocks in these periods (Karceski, 2002). Return-chasing by retail 
investors, unable to distinguish between the proportion of returns that comes from the fund alpha 
and that which comes from its exposure to risk factors, increases portfolio flows and fees to these 
funds. EMN hedge funds may employ similar strategies, resulting in a limited or potentially 
positive relation between fund performance and systematic risk, particularly in strong market 
states. 
In addition, choosing to consistently maintain low systematic risk regardless of market 
conditions entails taking on additional risk, particularly in down markets. Buraschi, Kosowski, 
and Trojani (2014) show that hedge funds that achieve low systematic risk via implementation of 
long-short and arbitrage strategies incur significant correlation risk, resulting in low ex-post 
                                                          
9
 Hedge funds employ a variety of investment strategies, not all of which are necessarily associated with the 
objective of low systematic risk. As discussed in more detail below, we focus our analysis on hedge funds in the 
equity market neutral and equity hedge styles which have the self-declared objective of low systematic risk. We 
refer to hedge funds of these two styles collectively as equity market neutral (EMN). 
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portfolio diversification and hedge effectiveness.
10
 In a multi-dimensional covariance matrix, the 
effects of correlation shocks are not easily predicted. Hence, management of correlation risk 
entails broad reductions of portfolio reliance on long-short positions, with the potential of 
uncoupling the beta hedge. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider the 
divergent incentives of joint minimization of systematic and correlation risk in the context of 
manager risk preferences. The extent to which investors are aware of and consider correlation 
risk in the context of EMN hedge funds has also never been explored. 
 
3. Measuring Systematic Risk 
As in the literature surveyed above, we utilize factor models to estimate fund exposure to 
systematic risk. The problem of identifying the factors to use in systematic risk factor models is 
non-trivial due to the large number of known and unknown potential factors and the limited 
degrees of freedom in each regression. To address this issue, we draw on Pukthuanthong and 
Roll (2009) who analyze levels of world systematic risk across equity indexes for a broad sample 
of developed, emerging, and frontier countries. Specifically, they calculate the principal 
components (PC) of a global sample of country indexes and then regress daily country index 
returns on these global PCs, using the R
2
 of that model to measure systematic risk. This approach 
has the advantage of using a comprehensive set of systematic risk factors within the confines of a 
limited number of degrees of freedom when estimating annual systematic risk with monthly fund 
returns. We obtain asset data from Datastream (see Appendix B for a summary). The list of 251 
assets included in our PC estimates is as comprehensive as possible and is drawn from a survey 
of the hedge fund literature (see for example, Fung and Hsieh, 2004 or Titman and Tiu, 2011). 
                                                          
10
 Buraschi et al. (2014) define correlation risk as the risk derived from unexpected changes in the correlation 
between the returns of different assets or asset classes. 
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For each calendar year, we calculate the covariance matrix of USD monthly returns for the 251 
assets.
11
 From this matrix, we compute eigenvectors and sort them from the smallest to the 
largest eigenvalue. The PCs are then estimated from returns in the subsequent calendar year. This 
process is repeated in each calendar year, ultimately resulting in 15 calendar years of monthly 
frequency, out-of-sample PCs. 
 As in Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), we use the first 10 PCs as systematic risk factors. 
On average, these PCs explain approximately 99% of the variability in the returns of the 
considered assets. Our systematic risk proxy is the R
2 
obtained from the regression of hedge fund 
returns on the 10 PCs: 
𝑃𝐶10: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝑃𝐶𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
10
𝑛=1     (1) 
where Ri,t is the return to fund i in month t and n denotes the PC estimated from the 251 assets 
described in Appendix B. 
 Titman and Tiu (2011) observe that in their sample, the portfolio of low R
2
 funds (with 
low systematic risk exposure) has substantial volatility that cannot be explained by the common 
factors used in their model. Their evidence suggests that, although these funds have low 
correlations with the large group of common factors explored, the funds tend to be correlated 
with each other. Similarly, Bollen (2013) uses style factors as systematic risk proxies and finds 
that portfolios of funds with R
2
 of zero in those models contain half the volatility of portfolios of 
other funds and thus have substantial systematic risk. These tests indicate the presence of an 
omitted systematic risk factor not captured by the style factors. In unreported tests, we calculate 
                                                          
11
 Given the range of assets held by hedge funds, we opt for an inclusive set of assets in the principal component 
analysis but recognize that inclusivity comes potentially at the cost of precision. For example, Johnstone and Lu 
(2009) argue that eigenvalues and eigenvectors estimated from large, singular covariance matrices are noisy. It 
should be noted that noise in the eigenvector estimates, if anything, biases against our results. For robustness, we 
replicate our analyses with smaller asset sets (for example, the set of assets utilized by Pukthuanthong and Roll 
(2009)) and find qualitatively similar results. 
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the correlation matrix of monthly residual values from the systematic risk model where the 
value-weighted index return to each hedge fund strategy is regressed on the first 10 principal 
components calculated from the 251 assets. The residual correlations are typically low, with an 
average value of 0.16 and only 9 of the 36 correlation values significantly differ from zero at the 
5% level. These results suggest that the 10 principal components capture an omitted risk factor 
not captured in the Titman and Tiu (2011) models and highlight the importance of factor 
selection in multi-factor model estimates of systematic risk exposure. 
Although the PC10 systematic risk measure in equation (1) is appealing given its ability to 
mitigate potential omitted variable bias induced by factor selection constraints, it has several 
limitations. First, estimation of annual systematic risk by relating 12 monthly returns to 10 PCs 
results in a model with one degree of freedom which may generate unstable estimates. Second, 
hedge funds often invest in illiquid securities for which market prices are not readily available, 
resulting in returns that appear smoother than true economic returns (Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov, 2004). Funds may also employ management strategies or invest in derivative assets 
that result in non-linear payoffs. Systematic risk proxies based on a linear underlying estimation 
may therefore systematically underestimate systematic risk for funds with these return features.  
We address these issues by employing a second factor model which includes the first PC 
extracted from the asset list in Appendix B plus a proxy for the degree of return smoothing 
estimated from the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) model and a proxy for the importance 
of non-linear factors in fund returns, estimated as in Fung and Hsieh (2004).
12
 Since the first PC 
explains 66% of the variability in the returns of the considered assets, it is a reasonable proxy for 
a systematic risk factor by itself.  
                                                          
12
 Titman and Tiu (2011) utilize the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors for the 
same purpose. 
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𝑃𝐶3: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑃𝐶1𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖𝜃0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   (2) 
where PC1 is the first PC extracted from the assets in the Appendix, 𝜃0,𝑡 is an estimate for the 
degree of return smoothing and NF is an estimate of the importance of nonlinear factors to fund 
returns.  
 An inherent weakness in each of these models is the imposition of an annual horizon over 
which to estimate systematic risk. For example, a fund with high systematic risk at the start of 
the year, which adjusts its portfolio to low systematic risk in July will have moderate systematic 
risk for that year in our model. To address this issue, Bollen and Whaley (2009) employ a 
change-point analysis to estimate shifts in hedge fund systematic risk. However, as they note, the 
limited history of hedge funds allows only 1 change-point for each fund between 1994 and 2005. 
To ensure the imposition of annual systematic risk estimates is not biasing our results, we 
replicate our analysis using alternative horizons of 1.5 and 2 years for all three models described 
above. These models provide similar degrees of freedom to prior papers − for example, Titman 
and Tiu (2011) include 5 risk factors in stepwise regression models using monthly return 
observations and two-year windows. We obtain similar results (unreported) for the alternative 
horizons and reach the same conclusions.  
  A further limitation of our approach is our assumption that managers implement long-
short portfolio strategies with financial assets. Alternative investment strategies exist that could 
generate low systematic risk based on our proxy but require little SRM skill. For example, a fund 
holding 100% cash, a fund that invests in lottery tickets or a fund that invests in far out-of-the-
money put options on the SP500 would have near zero systematic risk. As the true portfolio 
holdings of hedge funds are unobservable, we cannot exclude the presence of such strategies in 
our sample.  
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 We quantify high SRM skill as managers who maintain their fund in the bottom quintile 
of systematic risk over a 3-year window. Correspondingly, low SRM skill managers change 
systematic risk rank in each year of the 3-year window. Admittedly, our selection of 3-year 
windows is ad hoc but is motivated by the short time series of our sample and the desire to allow 
time variation in SRM skill. Despite the self-stated mandate to maintain low systematic risk, it is 
possible that a manager skilled in SRM would choose to employ a market timing strategy, 
varying fund systematic risk across the cycle. Our measure of SRM skill would overlook such 
managers. Presumably EMN hedge fund investors invest in this asset class for the properties of 
low systematic risk and these preferences would create manager incentives to maintain low 
systematic risk. Prior analysis suggests that funds with lower systematic risk are rewarded with 
higher flows (Titman and Tiu, 2011). We re-examine the relation between investor preferences 
and systematic risk below and examine if managers with transitory systematic risk have market 
timing ability to validate our proxy for SRM skill. 
 
4. Data 
We obtain hedge fund data from the Center for International Securities and Derivatives 
Markets (CISDM) and TASS Lipper. Although there is a substantial overlap between the two 
data providers, they do track different funds, and so we utilize the combined datasets after 
excluding duplicates. Although hedge fund data is available starting in January 1990, we restrict 
our sample to January 1996 to December 2010, as prior to 1996, the data to estimate correlation 
risk (discussed in detail below) is unavailable. Data from both providers includes both active and 
defunct funds and thus is survivorship bias free during our period of analysis.
 
We focus on 
Equity Market Neutral and Equity Hedge (EMN) strategy funds. As previously discussed, hedge 
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funds employ a variety of strategies and not all strategies necessarily target low systematic risk. 
Thus, our analysis focuses on funds for which low systematic risk is a stated objective.
13
 We also 
exclude fund of funds, multi-strategy funds, funds with non-US dollar returns, and funds which 
report only gross returns. To control for potential backfill bias, we follow Aggarwal and Jorion 
(2010) and exclude funds with a back-fill period greater than 180 days.
 14
  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the hedge funds included in our sample, reported 
separately for the two styles considered in the analysis. On average, funds in our sample manage 
271 million USD in assets, charge management fees of 1.3% and incentive fees of 17%. The life 
of a fund in our sample is, on average, 57 months or 4.75 years, which reflects the rapid growth 
in the industry in the later portion of our sample, rather than a high failure rate of funds.  
 
 
5. Systematic Risk Persistence 
To motivate our use of the persistence of systematic risk as a proxy for manager skill, we first 
examine how persistent systematic risk levels are across time and across the cross-section of 
funds. If systematic risk levels are reasonably time invariant, or move in tandem across funds, 
then an examination of persistence in systematic risk as a proxy for manager skill will be non-
informative. To measure time series variation in systematic risk, we estimate annual systematic 
risk by fund from 1996 to 2010 using equation (1) and form systematic risk quintile ranks.
15
 
                                                          
13
 Our results are similar if all hedge fund styles are included in the sample and after including style fixed effects in 
the panel regressions. Approximately 50% of the total hedge fund sample consists of EMN style funds. 
14
 We obtain similar results and reach the same conclusions if funds with back-fill periods greater than 180 days are 
included in the sample. 
15
 We obtain similar results if the alternative systematic risk proxy (defined in equations (2)) is used. 
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Table 2 reports the transition matrix of systematic risk ranks formed either annually or bi-
annually. The R
2
 proxy for systematic risk ranges from an average value of 83% for the highest 
quintile to 17% for the lowest quintile, with the values decreasing in a monotonic fashion 
between quintiles. The range in mean R
2 
values suggests that the sorts are capturing meaningful 
differences in systematic risk across quintiles. 
On average, only 27% of funds remain in the same systematic risk quintile rank between 
years (grey shaded cells reflect the percentage of funds that remained in each rank). Annual 
persistence in systematic risk rank is higher for high systematic risk funds (36% remain in the 
highest quintile) relative to low systematic risk funds (20% of funds remain in the low quintile 
rank). Extending the analysis to a two-year horizon produces similar results. On average, 29% of 
funds remain in the same quintile rank two years later. Fewer funds remain in the highest quintile 
rank between the one- and two-year horizons (36% relative to 30%). However, the number of 
funds that remained in the bottom quintile increases over the two-year horizon (20% relative to 
41%) suggesting that 21% of funds drop out of the bottom quartile in the first year and return in 
the second year.  
To provide an assessment of the influence of macroeconomic factors on systematic risk 
ranks, we partition the one year transition matrix into terciles based on market state, proxied by 
the DEF spread (only the bottom and top terciles are reported).
16
 Annual DEF spread values are 
calculated as the mean end-month values of the difference between an AA and BB ranked 
corporate bond index in each year. On average, 29% of funds remain in the same systematic risk 
quintile year over year in the strong market state (low DEF tercile) relative to 33% of funds 
                                                          
16
 We also obtain similar results if market state is alternatively proxied by the TED spread. 
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remaining in the same tercile in the weak market state (high DEF tercile). Consistency in 
systematic risk rank persistence across market states suggests that systematic risk shifts are either 
predominantly random or driven by fund-level factors.  
A potential issue with the analysis in Table 2 is that the rank process fails to capture the 
stability of the absolute level of systematic risk. In other words, the risk of a given fund may 
remain constant and it is the change in risk of the comparison funds which causes the fund to 
change rank. To address this issue, in Figure 1, we separately form ranks annually and across the 
entire sample in one sort. The entire sample sort benchmarks the systematic risk of the fund in 
each year to a constant benchmark as opposed to the relative benchmark of risk of comparison 
funds in each year. Our results are similar between the two sorts. In the annual sorting method, 
on average 24%, 30%, and 46% do not change rank, change 1 rank, or change more than 1 rank, 
respectively. In the entire sample sorting method, the comparison average values are 24%, 26%, 
and 49%. The similarity of these results suggests the quintile shifts in risk arise due to changes in 
fund-level risk and not time-varying benchmarks. 
To provide an alternative perspective, we examine how systematic risk levels and correlation 
risk are related to market state. Table 3 reports average systematic and correlation risk levels by 
DEF tercile. Consistent with trends noted in equity markets, we find that a greater proportion of 
EMN hedge fund returns are explained by global risk proxies during times of financial stress. In 
other words, EMN hedge funds become more integrated with global markets precisely when 
diversification effects are most needed by investors. Specifically, average R
2
 value increases by 
21% between periods of low and high DEF.  
As previously discussed, hedge fund managers must also consider correlation risk when 
choosing the optimal systematic risk level for a fund. As correlation risk increases in weak 
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market states, the noted increase in systematic risk may reflect a managerial reaction to 
correlation risk. To measure fund-level correlation risk, we estimate return loadings on the 
correlation risk factor as estimated in Buraschi et al. (2014). Specifically, the correlation risk 
factor is measured as the spread in implied and realized correlations for stocks in the S&P 500 
index using derivative contract prices. Over our sample period of 1996 to 2010, the correlation 
risk factor has a mean value of -12.18, with a median of -8.22 and standard deviation of 19.54. 
These values are reasonably consistent with the estimates in Buraschi et al. (2014) 
of -10.96, -7.92, and 16.78, respectively, which they estimate from 1996 to 2008.
17
 In aggregate, 
factor loading on the correlation risk factor increases by 54% between low and high periods of 
DEF. This result reflects a significant increase in EMN hedge fund correlation risk as broad 
market conditions deteriorate and highlights the challenges faced by managers in managing 
systematic risk. It should be recognized that the increase in correlation risk is muted by any 
adjustments the fund manager has made to mitigate correlation risk by increasing the systematic 
risk of the fund. Here again, trends are broadly consistent, or perhaps stronger, for funds in the 
equity market neutral style. 
 To summarize these results, systematic risk ranks are highly variable, with typically less 
than 30% of funds remaining in the same rank year over year. Average systematic risk levels 
increase during periods of stress in financial markets, which coincide with increases in 
correlation risk. This trend potentially arises due to active management of systematic risk by 
managers who alter the hedge position of the fund to reduce its exposure to correlation risk. 
These results lead us to one of two conclusions: 1) Either maintaining stable systematic risk is 
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 S&P 500 derivative data was obtained from Optionmetrics and commences in 1996. Thus, as previously 
discussed, by necessity we limit the analysis in the paper to the period of 1996 to 2010. 
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challenging and a skill that is potentially a rare commodity or 2) managers forego systematic risk 
stability to avail of market timing opportunities.  
 
6. The Dynamic Management of Systematic Risk 
Precisely how do EMN hedge fund managers adjust the risk exposure of their funds? How 
do these approaches vary between high and low skill managers? To answer these questions, we 
examine time series variation in hedge fund loadings on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. We 
chose these factors as they are commonly utilized in fund performance models as benchmarks for 
assets commonly held by hedge funds with non-linear payoffs. These factors capture a broad 
spectrum of the assets we consider in Appendix B. We do not utilize the PCs from equation (1) 
in this setting as we seek to identify tangible, easily interpreted risk exposures which vary over 
the cycle. We show that variation of these factors is indeed related to persistence in fund 
systematic risk further in the paper.  
We calculate factor loadings over two- year periods, starting in 1996 and concluding with a 
three-year period spanning 2008 to 2010. Panel (a) of Table 4 reports the time series of factor 
loadings estimated as a pooled OLS regression of all funds in the sample. Of the seven factors, 
the equity market, size spread, bond market, and credit spread factors have the largest absolute 
loading size and it is for these factors that the largest variability in loading is observed (typically 
twice the loading and variability on the other three factors). These results suggest that managers 
typically vary exposure to these factors when seeking to vary the systematic risk of their funds. 
The analysis in Panel (a) of Table 4 is provided to motivate and provide context for our 
primary analysis which examines variation in SRM between high and low skilled managers. To 
facilitate this analysis, we calculate the same factor loadings by fund and then calculate the 
 - 19 - 
 
cross-sectional standard deviation of factor loadings between high and low SRM skill subsets. 
Our measure of systematic risk skill is motivated by Table 2. We define high skill managers as 
those which maintain their fund in the bottom systematic risk quintile over the prior three-year 
period since these managers have fulfilled the self-stated fund mandate of EMN hedge funds to 
maintain low systematic risk exposure. In contrast, for low SRM managers, the systematic risk 
quintile rank of the fund changes in each of the prior three years. The skill classification updates 
annually. Thus, our definition allows hedge fund managers to transition across skill 
classifications over time. 
Panel (b) of Table 4 reports the results, reporting the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
the four factor loadings (equity, size, bond, and credit spread) with the largest absolute size in 
Panel (a), segmented both by manager skill and market state (proxied by the DEF spread). 
Results for the other three loadings are typically much smaller and insignificant. The focus of our 
analysis is on the bottom frame of Panel (b), which reports the difference in cross-sectional 
factor loading standard deviation between high and low skill managers.  
In the strong market state (low DEF), we observe a higher level of consistency in factor 
loadings amongst high relative to low skill managers (lower standard deviation in factor 
loadings). As market conditions deteriorate (transition from low to high DEF), we observe that 
this relation reverses. The difference in standard deviation of factor loadings between high and 
low skill managers is positive and significant for each of the primary factors except the bond 
factor (t-statistic 1.58). Thus, in periods of stress in financial markets when correlation risk and 
systematic risk passively increase, the standard deviation of factor loadings for high skill 
managers typically increases dramatically while those of low skill managers typically shrinks as 
dramatically. This suggests that in weak markets, skilled hedge fund managers are more active in 
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seeking mechanisms to manage both risks and typically take positions different from their peers 
while unskilled managers herd. 
 
7. Determinants of Systematic Risk Management Skill 
We now examine the determinants of SRM skill and the characteristics of high SRM skill 
managers. Table 5 reports cross-sectional logit models where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the fund has remained in the bottom quintile of systematic risk over 
the prior three years. This proxy for SRM skill is used throughout the remainder of the paper. As 
determinant variables, we consider variability in Fung and Hsieh 7-factors, correlation risk and 
manager and fund characteristics. Factor loading variability and correlation risk are as previously 
defined in Tables 3 and 4. Following Li, Zhang, and Zhao (2011), as a proxy for either 
intelligence or education of the fund manager, we use the composite SAT score from the U.S. 
News and World Report and the Princeton Review of 2003 of the undergraduate college that the 
fund manager attended. We also use the number of years the fund manager has worked as a 
proxy for management experience or career concerns (Work Experience). Both variables are 
reported in TASS. As in Li, Zhang, and Zhao (2011), we exclude manager age and tenure (which 
are also reported by TASS) from our analysis as age is missing for over half of the dataset and 
tenure is highly correlated (0.95) with work experience.
18
 The fund-level determinants are as 
previously described in Table 4. 
The fund characteristics variables we consider include fund age in years, fund size 
measured by total net assets, annual return, the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 
prior year, fund flow defined as: 
Flowi,t = (TNAi,t – TNAi,t-1 × (1+Ri,t))/TNAi,t-1     (3) 
                                                          
18
 Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that the number of years worked is a better proxy for manager experience than 
tenure.  
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where TNA is total net assets to fund i at the end of year t and R is the fund return, the natural 
logarithm of the required minimum initial investment, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund 
uses leverage in its investment strategy, and the lengths of the lockup, redemption, and 
subscription periods (in days). The redemption period is defined as the sum of the redemption 
and advance notice periods required for investors to redeem shares and the subscription period is 
defined as the delay between investing in the fund and the purchase being processed. Finally, we 
include fund fee attributes, including the management and incentive fee and an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the fund has a high water mark provision. Average style return and flow 
are included to capture style effects on systematic risk. To capture barriers to flow, we also 
include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund is active or open to new investment at the end 
of 2010. Since TASS reports static fee data in each data release, to build the time-series of fees 
for each fund, we access multiple end-of-year releases of the database. As multiple database 
releases were not available for the CISDM dataset, funds unique to that data provider are 
excluded from the fund-level analysis. Although TASS commenced reporting lockup and high 
water mark data in 2002, this data is available in CISDM from the start of the dataset. Therefore, 
we use the CISDM dataset to fill lockup and high water mark values missing in the TASS 
dataset for overlapping funds. Funds in the TASS dataset that closed prior to 2002 and which do 
not overlap with the CISDM dataset are excluded. We obtain the same results using the full 
TASS dataset, excluding the lockup and high water mark controls. In all the time-series panel 
regressions in the paper, standard errors are clustered by time and fund family. 
Given the high level of consistency in results, we focus our discussion on model (2). We 
first note a positive and significant association between equity risk, credit risk, and bond risk 
factor loading volatility and manager skill, suggesting that high skill managers more commonly 
vary these factors when managing systematic risk. The relation with the size spread factor 
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loading is also positive but not significant. Correlation risk and correlation risk standard 
deviation is typically lower in funds managed by high skill managers and this relation is more 
pronounced in weak market states when DEF is higher (positive and significant relation between 
manager skill and the interaction of correlation risk and DEF).  
Turning to fund manager characteristics, we find that managers with high SRM skills tend 
to be better educated and be more experienced (positive relation with SAT Score and work 
experience). Older and larger funds tend to have higher skilled managers, consistent with the 
observed relations with manager characteristics. We also find a positive relation between fund 
performance and manager skill. Systematic risk levels are more persistent for funds that have 
realized higher prior performance, performance persistence, and greater investment inflows. The 
same relations are observed at the style level. Persistence in systematic risk is more likely 
following higher style level returns and inflows of investment at the style level. Funds with 
longer subscription periods and higher initial investment requirements typically have higher skill 
managers. Finally, higher incentive fees are positively associated with SRM skill.  
A possible interpretation of these results is that managers that have performed well (and 
have attracted high flows) in the past have more leeway when it comes to managing systematic 
risk.  In section 9, we show that investors appear to react to fund performance rather than to 
persistence in systematic risk. Managers who have performed poorly in the past are unlikely to 
be given leeway to manage systematic risk. 
 
 
8. SRM Skill and Hedge Fund Performance 
 
Thus far, we have explored the how persistent are levels of hedge fund systematic risk, the 
channels through which managers influence the systematic risk of their funds and managerial 
and fund characteristics associated with persistence in low systematic risk. We now return to the 
question of independence in asset selection and SRM skill and the association between SRM 
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skill and hedge fund performance. We seek to understand if asset selection and SRM skill are 
indeed joint attributes associated with a select subset of superior fund managers or whether the 
skill sets are independent. To model this relation, we relate hedge fund performance (measured 
as annual Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factors alphas) to factor loading variability, an indicator 
variable for SRM skill set to 1 if the manager remained in the bottom quintile of systematic risk 
for three years (as previously defined), correlation risk and its standard deviation and controls.
19
 
We include the factor loading variability variables to capture the relation between active SRM 
and fund performance. As active SRM triggers trading costs and the intangible cost of engaging 
manager attention away from asset selection, we expect a negative relation between fund 
performance and proxies for the level of SRM. The variables in the models are standardized 
(mean=0, STD=1) to ensure comparability. The test of interest is whether high SRM skill 
managers create value for investors via active SRM (i.e. is the sum of the coefficients on factor 
loading volatility and the SRM skill indicator greater than 0). As the relations between fund 
performance and the control variables are well understood in the extant literature, control 
variable coefficients are suppressed in the results reported in Table 6 in the interest of brevity. 
Coefficients related to correlation risk are reported as this variable is not considered as broadly in 
the hedge fund literature.  
 Focusing first on the full sample model, on average, active SRM factor loading revisions, 
is a drag on fund performance. The relation between alpha and the four factor loading volatility 
variables is either negative (for equity risk and credit risk) or insignificant (size spread and bond 
risk). To provide a sense of economic magnitude, a joint one standard deviation shift in the four 
factor standard deviation variables relates to a 1.7% reduction in annual fund alpha. Consistent 
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 We obtain similar results and reach the same conclusions utilizing alternative proxies for fund performance 
including fund returns in excess of the style average, Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio. 
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with Titman and Tiu (2011) but in contrast to Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2012), we find a 
positive association between SRM skill and fund performance. However, when the net benefit to 
investors is considered (sum of the factor loading volatility and SRM skill coefficients) the 
relation weakens 3-fold.  
 To further test the independence of SRM and asset selection skill, we partition the model 
into market state terciles (proxied by DEF as in prior models).
20
 If asset selection and SRM skill 
are joint characteristics of superior fund managers, the relation between fund performance and 
SRM skill should be time invariant. However, if the two skills are independent, the relation 
should be time varying as SRM skill is more difficult and requires greater allocation of attention 
in weak market states when correlation risk is increasing and historic correlation patterns become 
less informative for realized correlations. The relation between SRM skill and fund performance 
is positive in both the positive and negative market state while the relation between active SRM 
and performance is negative. However, the sum of the coefficients is positive only in the strong 
market state. These results are consistent with time variation in manager attention allocation to 
tasks. In the weak market state, managers with SRM skill allocate greater attention to SRM to the 
detriment of fund alpha. In the strong market state, managers appear to allocate greater effort to 
asset selection and generate substantial benefits for investors.  
To provide a sense of scale, on average, high skill managers generate a net benefit of 1971 
bps per annum in the strong market state relative to no statistically significant net benefit in the 
weak market state. These results are in line with Kacperczyk, Nieuwerbergh, and Veldkamp 
(2014) who propose a measure of mutual fund manager skill based on the manager’s ability to 
shift the weight of his attention between market timing in recessions and asset selection in 
booms. In the hedge fund setting, high skill managers allocate attention much in the same way, 
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 Similar results are obtained if TED is used as an alternative proxy for market state. 
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but focus on maintaining low systematic risk in recessions, as opposed to seeking to exploit the 
recovery via portfolio beta adjustments. Similarly, Glode (2011) argues that mutual fund 
managers exert greater effort in weak market states at which times investors are willing to pay 
higher rents and their market utility of consumption is higher.  
Finally, to capture the net benefit of SRM skill to investors across market states, we 
partition the model by SRM skill.
21
 High skill managers are as previously defined, we label a 
fund as managed by a low SRM skill manager if the quintile of systematic risk changes for the 
fund in each of the prior three years. The coefficient for systematic risk is three times the 
magnitude for high relative to low skilled managers (-0.34 vs. -0.12) and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, the net benefits of active SRM accrue 
only to high skilled managers. For the low skill managers, the cost of systematic risk 
management by adjusting factor loadings exceeds the benefit by almost two fold (-0.29 vs. -0.17, 
reflecting a net loss of -0.18, which relates on average to 832 bps per annum). Interestingly, the 
sensitivity of fund performance to correlation risk and correlation risk volatility is higher for high 
skill managers. This result further illustrates the inherent conflict when jointly seeking to 
minimize both systematic and correlation risk and points to further costs associated with 
minimization of systematic risk by high skill managers. 
 
9. Investor Sensitivity to Fund Systematic Risk 
Next we examine the extent to which investors recognize and value dynamic management 
of hedge fund systematic risk. To proxy for investor preferences, we use fund flow which we 
relate to factor loading volatility, SRM skill, and correlation risk, and control variables. The 
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 We obtain similar results and reach the same conclusions in Tables 6 and 7 if funds which undergo a manager 
change in the three year period of skill identification are excluded from the sample. 
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analysis is reported in Table 7. As in Table 6, in the interest of brevity, we do not report 
coefficient values for the control variables and the variables in the models are standardized 
(mean=0, STD=1) to ensure comparability. 
Focusing first on the full sample model, investors appear to understand that active factor 
management is a drag on fund performance, preferring funds with low factor loading volatility. 
Specifically, the coefficients on equity risk and credit risk (the same factors that most strongly 
influenced performance) are negative and significant at the 10% level (t-statistics 2.17 and 1.75, 
respectively). To provide a sense of economic magnitude, a joint one standard deviation shift in 
the four factor loading volatility variables is related to a 0.9% reduction in annual flow. Hedge 
fund investors appear to recognize SRM skill, rewarding high skill managers with incremental 
flow (coefficient value of 0.28, t-statistic 3.97 on the SRM skill indicator variable). 
To capture incremental sensitivity to systematic risk during periods of financial stress, we 
partition the sample using terciles of the market condition proxy DEF (as previously defined). 
Investor sensitivity to factor loading volatility and systematic risk is remarkably similar across 
market states, with the exception that investors place greater emphasis on credit risk in weak 
market states.  
As in the performance analysis, dynamic risk management yields a net benefit to the fund 
in terms of incrementally higher flow only in the strong market state. Rationally, investors would 
be expected to favor low systematic risk in weak market states when the systematic risk hedge is 
most likely fund value enhancing and investor marginal utility of consumption is higher (Glode, 
2011). The stronger preference for low systematic risk in the strong market state suggests that 
investors are reacting to fund performance as opposed to continuity in fund systematic risk 
levels. Partitioning the model between high and low SRM skill managers, we find a stronger 
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relation between fund flow and systematic risk for high skill managers. This result potentially 
suggests that more savvy investors are able to select high SRM skill managers and these 
investors are more prone to monitor and react to the systematic risk level of the fund. 
 
10. Market Timing by Hedge Funds 
As previously discussed, a potential issue with our proxy for SRM skill is its dependence 
on the self-stated mandate by hedge funds to maintain low systematic risk. Our skill proxy 
overlooks managers with SRM skill who abandon this mandate and instead seek to time the 
market, delivering low systematic risk in weak market states and realizing the performance 
benefits of a high beta position in strong market states. Evidence regarding the ability of hedge 
funds to time the market is mixed. For example, Chen and Liang (2007) examine the market-
timing ability of funds from the self-described market-timing style. In their sample from 1994 to 
2005, they find evidence of market-timing ability at both the fund and aggregate levels. In 
contrast, Fung, Xu, and Yao (2002) find that global hedge fund managers do not show market-
timing ability in their 1994 to 2000 sample of 115 funds and Chen (2007) finds limited evidence 
of market-timing ability across nine hedge fund styles. 
To test the market-timing ability of hedge fund managers, we first categorize each fund in 
our sample as a market-timing or stable fund. Market-timing funds are funds which shift from 
the top to the bottom tercile of systematic risk (or vice versa) at least twice during the timeframe 
of our sample. The remaining funds are classified as stable (i.e. having consistent systematic risk 
rankings). Approximately 39% of the funds in our sample are classified as market-timing funds. 
We then estimate the Henriksson-Merton (1981) market-timing model (HM model) separately 
for market-timing and stable funds: 
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 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗∅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟𝑚,𝑡𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐾
𝑗=1      (4) 
where rp is the excess return on the equal-weighted portfolio of market-timing or stable funds, ϕ 
are the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors as previously described (K=7), rm is the excess return to 
the Fama and French (1993) market factor, and S is an indicator variable equal to one when the 
market factor is positive and is otherwise equal to zero. We find that neither the stable or market-
timing funds have market-timing ability. The market-timing coefficient (γ) is positive for both 
groups, 0.21 versus 0.16 for stable vs. market-timers but both coefficients are not statistically 
significant (t-statistics of 1.85and 1.71, respectively). Partitioning the model by financial market 
state yields similar results (i.e. neither group exhibits significant market-timing ability and the 
size of market-timing coefficient is similar between the groups). We find similar results in the 
aggregate sample, free of market-timer partitions. 
We undertake a series of robustness checks. First, we replicate the market timing analysis 
utilizing the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) market timing test, utilizing the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
7-factor model, and reach the same conclusions. Second, we replicate the market-timing model 
(equation (4)) adjusting for potential bias associated with using monthly return data when timing 
decisions can be made at the daily frequency as described in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ivković 
(2000): 
𝑟𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗∅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐾
𝑗=1      (5) 
𝑃𝑚,𝑡 = [( ∏ max {1 + 𝑟𝑚,𝜏, 1 + 𝑟𝑓,𝜏}
𝑡
𝜏𝜖𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑡)
) − 1] − 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 
 
where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free return. Using this alternative market-timing test specification again 
yields similar results. These results lead to two possible conclusions. First, broadly hedge fund 
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managers do not possess market timing skill or managers with SRM skill forgo market timing 
opportunities. Regardless, the results suggest that SRM skill is absent in the set of managers with 
variable fund systematic risk, providing validation of our proxy for SRM skill. 
 
11. Conclusions 
Hedge funds commonly market themselves as delivering alpha while controlling the level 
of systematic risk. In this paper, we investigate the dynamic risk management ability of hedge 
fund managers. Our results point to time varying allocation of effort by skilled hedge fund 
managers. During market downturns, systematic risk commonly increases as the returns to 
unrelated assets become increasingly correlated. In weak market states, skilled managers focus 
on maintaining low systematic risk via active adjustments to return factor loadings. The 
allocation of effort to this activity comes at the costs of fund alpha. In times of strengthening 
market states, skilled hedge fund managers forego market timing opportunities, maintaining low 
systematic risk. In strong market states, skilled managers generate incremental alpha to low skill 
managers via superior asset selection ability.  
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Appendix A: Summary of the Titman and Tiu (2011) Theoretical Model 
In the model, the manager forms a mean-variance efficient portfolio from three assets, a risk-free 
asset, a publicly available index (F) and a proprietary strategy (A) for which: 
𝐸[𝐹 − 𝑟𝑓] = 𝜇 > 0, 𝑠𝑡𝑑[𝐹] = 𝜎; 
𝐸[𝐴 − 𝑟𝑓] = 𝛼 > 0, 𝑠𝑡𝑑[𝐴] = 𝑇𝐸; 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐴, 𝐹) = 0 
Define wF and wA as the weights allocated by the manager to the index and proprietary strategy. 
The excess return to the strategy is then defined as R-rf=wA(A-rf)+wF(F-rf). The Sharpe ratio for 







      (A1) 
where β=wF/wA. 
To maximize the SR, the manager solves: 
max𝑤𝐹,𝑤𝐴 𝑆𝑅(𝑤𝐹, 𝑤𝐴)    (A2) 
The solution to equation (A2) is given by: 
 {
𝛽∗ = 𝜇 𝜎2⁄
𝑤𝐹
∗ = 𝛽∗𝑤𝐴
∗      (A3) 
and the SR of the optimal portfolio is: 
 








                (A4) 
To estimate the systematic risk exposure of the fund, R-rf can be regressed on F. From the above 
model, superior managers for which F>A will allocate greater portfolio weight to F (wF>wA), 




Appendix B: Principal Component Asset Sample Summary 
This Appendix summarizes the assets included in the global principal component analysis.  
 
Global Equity Indexes 
An index with the designation “RI” is a total return index (with reinvested dividends). The designation “PI” denotes a pure price index.  
Country Index Identification DS Mnemonic Country Index Identification DS Mnemonic 
Australia AUSTRALIA-DS MARKET  TOTMAU$(RI) Netherlands NETHERLAND-DS Market  TOTMKNL(RI)~U$ 




Belgium BELGIUM-DS Market  TOTMKBG(RI)~U$ Norway NORWAY-DS MARKET  TOTMNW$(RI) 




TTOCOMP(RI)~U$ Philippines PHILIPPINE SE I(PSEi)  PSECOMP(PI)~U$ 
















France FRANCE-DS Market  TOTMKFR(RI)~U$ South Korea 
KOREA SE COMPOSITE 
(KOSPI)  
KORCOMP(PI)~U$ 
Germany DAX 30 PERFORMANCE  DAXINDX(RI)~U$ Spain MADRID SE GENERAL  MADRIDI(PI)~U$ 
India INDIA BSE (100) IBOMBSE(PI)~U$ Sri Lanka COLOMBO SE SRALLSH(PI)~U$ 
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NATIONAL  ALLSHARE  




Israel ISRAEL TA 100  ISTA100(PI)~U$ Switzerland SWITZ-DS Market  TOTMKSW(RI)~U$ 
Italy ITALY-DS MARKET  TOTMIT$(RI) Taiwan TAIWAN SE WEIGHTED  TAIWGHT(PI)~U$ 
Japan TOPIX  TOKYOSE(RI)~U$ Thailand THAILAND-DS MARKET TOTMTH$(RI) 
Jordan 
AMMAN SE FINANCIAL 
MARKET  
AMMANFM(PI)~U$ Turkey ISE TIOL 100  TRKISTB(PI)~U$ 
Malaysia KLCI COMPOSITE  KLPCOMP(PI)~U$ 
United 
Kingdom 
UK-DS MARKET  TOTMUK$(RI) 
Mexico MEXICO IPC (BOLSA)  MXIPC35(PI)~U$ United States S&P 500 COMPOSITE  S&PCOMP(RI)~U$ 







Albanian Lek Colombian Peso Icelandic Krona Nigerian Naira Surinamese Dollar 
Algerian Dinar Comorian Franc Indian Rupee Norwegian Krone Swedish Krona 
Angolan Kwanza Congo (DRC) Francs Indonesian Rupiah Omani Rial Swiss Franc 
Argentine Peso Croatian Kuna Irish Punt or Pound Pakistani Rupee Taiwanese Dollar 
Australian Dollar Cyprian Pound Israeli Sheqel Papua New Guinean Kina Tanzanian Shilling 
Austrian Schilling Czech Koruna Italian Lira Paraguayan Guarani Thai Baht 
Azerbajanian Manat Danish Krone Japanese Yen Peruvian Nuevo Sol Tongan Pa'anga 
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Bahraini Dinar Dominican Peso Jordanian Dinar Philippine Peso Trinidad & Tobago Dollar 
Bangladeshi Taka Dutch Guilder Kazakh Tenge Polish Zloty Tunisian Dinar 
Belarusian Ruble East Caribbean Dollar Kenyan Shilling Portuguese Escudo Turkish Lira 
Belgian Franc Ecuadorian Sucre Korean Won Qatari Riyal Ugandan Shilling 
Belizean Dollar Egyptian Pound Kuwaiti Dinar Romanian Leu Ukrainian Hryvnia 
Bermudian Dollar Estonian Kroon Latvian Lat Russian Federation Rouble United Arab Emirates Dirham 
Bolivian Boliviano Euro Lebanese Pound Samoan Tala United Kingdom Pound 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Dinar Fijian Dollar Lithuanian Lita Saudi Arabian Riyal United States Dollar 
Botswana Pula Finnish Markka Luxembourg Franc Serbian Dinar Uruguayan Peso 
Brazilian Real French Franc Malawian Kwacha Sierra Leonean Leone Vanuatuan Vatu 
Brunei Darussalam Dollar Gambian Dalasi Malaysian Ringgit Singaporean Dollar Venezuelan Bolivar 
Bulgarian Lev Georgian Lari Maltese Lira Slovak Koruna Vietnamese Dong 
Burundian Franc German Mark Mauritanian Ouguiya Slovenian Tolar Zambian Kwacha 
C.F.P. Franc Ghanaian Cedi Mauritian Rupee Solomon Islands Dollar Zimbabwean Dollar 
Canadian Dollar Greek Drachma Mexican Peso South African Rand 
 Cayman Islands Dollar Guinean Franc Moroccan Dirham Spanish Peseta 
 Chilean Peso Hong Kong Dollar Mozambican Metical Special Drawing Right 










Name DS Mnemonic Market Source Currency 
BD BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMBD10Y Germany Datastream Euro 
BARCLAYS EURO AGGREGATE (E) LHAGGBE International Barclays Capital Euro 
BARCLAYS EURO AGG GOVERNMENT (E) LHAGOVE International Barclays Capital Euro 
IBOXX EURO OVERALL INDEX ALL MATS. IBEURAL Overall iBoxx Euro 
IBOXX EURO SOVEREIGN EZONE ALL MATS IBSEZAL Sovereign iBoxx Euro 
IBOXX EURO SUB-SOV. SUPRA.ALL MATS. IBSUPAL Sub-Sovereign iBoxx Euro 
IBOXX EURO CORP. ALL MATS IBCRPAL Corporate iBoxx Euro 
EMU BENCHMARK 10 YR. DS GOVT. INDEX BMEM10Y EMU Datastream Euro 
FR BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMFR10Y France Datastream Euro 
IT BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMIT10Y Italy Datastream Euro 
JP BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMJP10Y Japan Datastream Japanese Yen 
BARCLAYS ASIA PACIC JAPAN ISSUERS LHAPJAP International Barclays Capital Japanese Yen 
BARCLAYS ASIA PACIC JAPANESE TSY. LHAPJTY International Barclays Capital Japanese Yen 
UK BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMUK10Y United Kingdom Datastream United Kingdom Pound 
IBOXX £ SOVEREIGN ALL MATURITIES IB£SOAL United Kingdom iBoxx United Kingdom Pound 
IBOXX £ IBoxx United Kingdom Sterling IB£CRAL Collateralised iBoxx United Kingdom Pound 
IBOXX £ CORP. ALL MATS. IB£CSAL Corporate iBoxx United Kingdom Pound 
IBOXX £ NON-GILTS ALL MATURITIES IB£GNAL Non-Gilts iBoxx United Kingdom Pound 
BOFA ML UK GILTS ALL MAT (Â£) MLUKALÂ£ United Kingdom Merrill Lynch United Kingdom Pound 
US BENCHMARK 10 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX BMUS10Y United States Datastream United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS US TREASURY BELLWETHERS 3M LHTBW3M United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
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BARCLAYS US TREASURY BELLWETHERS 2Y LHTBW2Y United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS US TREASURY BELLWETHERS 30Y LHTBL30 United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS US AGG GOVERNMENT LHGOVBD United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS US AGGREGATE LHAGGBD United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS US TREASURY LHUSTRY United States Barclays Capital United States Dollar 
BOFA ML TRSY MASTER ($) MLGTRSA United States Merrill Lynch United States Dollar 
BOFA ML US MORT MASTER ($) MLMORTM United States Merrill Lynch United States Dollar 
BARCLAYS PAN-EUR. AGG (E) LHPANAE International Barclays Capital Euro 
JPM EU EMBI GLB DIVS COMPOSITE JPMETOC International JP Morgan Euro 
JPM GBI BROAD ALL MATS. (LOC) JGGBALC Global Broad JP Morgan n/a 
JPM GBI GLOBAL ALL MATS. (LOC) JGGIALC Global JP Morgan n/a 
BOFA ML GLOBAL GVT INDEX ($) MLGGALM International Merrill Lynch United States Dollar 
CGBI WBIG OVERALL NON-US$ ($) SBWBX$$ Overall Citigroup United States Dollar 
CGBI USBIG OVERALL BROAD INV.GRADE SBBIGBI Overall Citigroup United States Dollar 
 
Commodities 
We include 27 different commodity futures. Our data on Brent Crude Oil is from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), Live Cattle, Feeder 
Cattle, Lean Hogs is from Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Corn, Soybeans, Soy Meal, Soy Oil, Wheat is from Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT), WTI Crude Oil is from New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Gold, Silver is from New York Commodities Exchange 
(COMEX), and Cotton, Coffee, Cocoa, Sugar is from New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). We also include the Goldman Sachs commodity 







We include the value weighted real estate investment trust (REIT) index from the Center for Research in Securities Prices and the Shiller 
housing index from Datastream (US S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDEX - 10-CITY COMPOSITE NADJ). 
 
Hedge Fund Factors 
We include the seven Fung and Hsieh (2004) hedge fund factors: Bond Trend Following Factor, Currency Trend Following Factor, 
Commodity Trend Following Factor, Equity Market Factor, Size Spread, Bond Market Factor, Credit Spread Factor and Emerging Market 
Risk Factor provided on David Hsieh’s webpage. 
 
Domestic Equity Factors 
In addition to the domestic equity factors collected from David Hsieh’s website, we also include the return to the Russell 3000 and 
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Table 1  
Summary of Hedge Fund Characteristics 
 
 Equity Hedge Equity Market Neutral Aggregate 
Return 13.58 10.17 13.09 
Total Net Assets (Mil. $) 284.98 190.14 271.23 
Management Fee (%) 1.18 1.70 1.26 
Incentive Fee (%) 16.33 17.56 16.51 
Redemption Notice (days) 39.03 34.44 38.36 
Lockup (months) 3.42 3.77 3.47 
Fund Age (months) 57.19 56.13 57.04 
No. Funds 1132 192 1324 
This table reports summary statistics for the hedge fund sample. Each variable is reported by style included in the sample 
over the timeframe of January 1996 to December 2010 (180 observations). Average end-of-month values are reported. 
Management and incentive fees are measured as a percentage of total net assets at year end. The redemption period is 
defined as the sum of the redemption and advanced notice periods required for investors to redeem shares and the 
subscription period is defined as the delay between investing in the fund and the purchase being processed. Lockup is the 




Table 2  






Systematic Risk Quintile RankT+1 
(Year 1) 
 
Systematic Risk Quintile RankT+2 
(Year 2) 
 Systematic Risk Quintile RankT+1 
Low DEF TercileT 
(Strong Markets) 
 Systematic Risk Quintile RankT+1 




R2 (%) High 4 3 2 Low 
 
High 4 3 2 Low 
 
High 4 3 2 Low 
 




















 High 83 36.34 24.14 7.79 12.58 19.15  29.86 16.07 13.50 25.72 14.85  30.70 22.19 21.28 15.62 10.21  39.23 12.18 12.64 20.63 15.32 
4 69 30.05 27.14 16.11 12.16 14.54  16.18 30.56 13.48 24.97 14.82  39.50 28.56 9.30 14.01 8.63  27.85 35.62 13.13 9.26 14.14 
3 53 15.48 28.09 22.91 10.16 23.36  19.40 28.79 29.85 9.49 12.47  11.00 22.23 20.72 13.60 32.44  15.94 31.37 30.62 7.76 14.31 
2 35 7.32 5.93 35.79 27.75 23.20  18.89 18.95 29.82 15.57 16.77  9.24 12.14 31.10 31.77 15.75  4.82 13.26 28.15 27.30 26.47 
Low 17 10.81 14.71 17.39 37.35 19.74  15.67 5.64 13.35 24.24 41.09  9.55 14.89 17.59 24.99 32.98  12.17 7.56 15.45 35.05 29.76 
 
Mean of shaded cells   26.78      29.39      28.95      32.51 
 This table reports, for each systematic risk quintile, the percentage of funds that remain in the same quintile and the fractions that transition to other quintiles in year 
T+1 or T+2. Funds which enter the sample in year T+1 or T+2 are excluded. The one year transition matrix is additionally bifurcated, focusing on periods when DEF is 
the in bottom (strong market) or top tercile (weak market). Systematic risk is calculated as the R
2
 from the annual frequency model:  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝑃𝐶𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
10
𝑛=1  
where Ri,t is the return to fund i in month t and n denotes the PC estimated from the 251 assets described in Appendix B. The mean R
2
 for each quintile is reported in 
year T. The annual value of the DEF spread is calculated as the mean of the end-of-month values of the difference between AA and BB corporate bond index yields 
within each year. Tercile sorts of are formed from the annual mean values, resulting in three partitions of seven years. The shaded cells report the percentage of funds 
that remained in each quintile between periods. 
 
  
Table 3  




Systematic Risk Correlation Risk 
Low (Strong) 0.4409 0.1064 
Medium 0.4544 0.1531 
High (Weak) 0.6509 0.1638 
H-L      0.2100
***
    0.0574
*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0013) 
This table reports the relation between market conditions and average hedge fund systematic and correlation risk, across 
time partitions defined by market state proxied by the DEF spread. Systematic risk is calculated as the R
2
 from the annual 
frequency model:  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝑃𝐶𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
10
𝑛=1  where Ri,t is the return to fund i in month t and n denotes the PC 
estimated from the 251 assets described in Appendix B. Correlation risk is measured as the fund return loading on the 
correlation risk factor estimated as in Buraschi et al. (2014). DEF spread partitions are formed as defined in Table 2. Mean 
risk values for each tercile are reported, followed by the difference between the third and first tercile means (H-L). The p-
value from the t-test of the difference in means is reported in brackets below each difference. Significance at the 10%, 5% 














The Dynamic Management of Systematic Risk 
 
Factor 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2010 Mean St. Dev. 
Panel (a)          
Bond trend-following 0.178 0.096 -0.002 -0.021 0.010 0.081 -0.024 0.048 0.088 
Currency trend-following 0.175 -0.011 0.210 0.066 0.100 0.052 0.001 0.085 0.090 
Commodity trend-following 0.223 -0.055 0.230 0.204 -0.011 -0.055 0.059 0.066 0.119 
Equity 0.580 0.563 0.441 0.171 -0.206 0.257 0.041 0.243 0.303 
Size spread 0.498 0.478 0.339 0.074 0.271 0.275 -0.057 0.246 0.150 
Bond  -0.532 -0.889 -0.173 -0.401 -0.085 0.045 -0.025 -0.316 0.356 
Credit spread -1.015 -0.685 -0.035 -0.479 -0.334 -0.250 -0.169 -0.375 0.260 
 
DEF Tercile Equity Size Spread Bond Credit Spread 
Panel (b) 
High SRM Skill Managers 
Low (Strong) 0.436 3.427 2.819 2.144 
Medium 1.813 5.197 2.364 15.738 





 0.129  47.623
***
 
 (2.06) (4.14) (0.75) (4.49) 
 
Low SRM Skill Managers 
Low (Strong) 17.391 45.005 2.577 59.935 
Medium 1.478 18.041 6.595 25.343 





 -2.169  -57.458
***
 
 (3.29) (4.45) (1.67) (3.74) 
 
Low - High SRM Skill Managers 





 (2.41) (3.80) (0.56) (4.72) 
Medium 0.334 -12.844
**
 -4.231 -9.606 
















 (2.79) (3.93) (1.58) (7.26) 
  
 
This table reports the time series and cross-sectional standard deviation of hedge fund return loading on the Fung-Hsieh (2000) 7 factors. Factor loadings are estimated over 
2 year periods using monthly hedge fund returns. Panel A summarizes the factor loadings by period and the mean and standard deviation of the estimated loadings. Panel B 
summarizes the standard deviation of factor loadings across funds, segmented by high and low SRM skill and the DEF spread (as previously defined). SRM skill is proxied 
by the standard deviation of the R
2
 over the prior three years from the annual regression of fund return on the 10 PCs estimated from the assets listed in Appendix B 
(equation (1)). High and Low skill managers are proxied by funds that remain in the lowest quintile of systematic risk over the prior three years (high skill) relative to funds 
that change quintile rank in each of the prior three years (low skill). The bottom frame of Panel B reports the difference in cross-sectional standard deviation of factor 










Fund Level Determinants of Systematic Risk 
 
Dependent Variable Systematic Risk Management Skillt 
Model (1) (2) 





 (3.08) (3.09) 
Size Spread St. Dev.t-1 0.07 0.05 
 (1.60) (1.10) 
Bond Risk St. Dev.t-1  0.08
**
 0.08 
 (2.25) (1.44) 
Credit Risk St. Dev.t-1  0.11
**
 0.11 
 (2.08) (1.72) 
Market characteristics   
Correlation Riskt-1 -0.08 -0.15
**
 
 (1.54) (2.60) 
DEFt-1   0.31
***
 
  (3.82) 
DEF×Correlation Risk t-1   0.25
***
 
  (3.40) 





 (2.53) (2.45) 















Fund Characteristics   












 (4.20) (4.43) 
Fund Returnt-1 0.43  0.43** 
 
(1.74) (2.08) 
Fund Return St. Deviation t-1  -0.09**  -0.10** 
 
(2.17) (2.06) 





 (4.08) (4.06) 







Leverage Indicator -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.87) (0.71) 
Lockup Period 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.25) (0.39) 
Redemption Period -0.02 -0.02 
 
(1.59) (1.07) 














Management Feet-1 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.37) (0.44) 





Style Returnt-1 0.08 0.11* 
 
(1.74) (1.88) 





 (5.15) (4.86) 
  
Active Indicator 0.33 0.35 
 
(1.14) (1.60) 





 19.01 22.28 
Number of observations 2,509 2,509 
This table reports logit, time-series, panel regression results of annual fund-level SRM skill related to determinant variables. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable set to 1 (otherwise zero) for funds that have remained in the bottom 
systematic risk quintile over the prior three years (as defined in Table 4). Systematic risk is calculated as previously defined 
in Table 4 using the PC10 model (equation (1)). Factor loading variability, DEF and correlation risk are as defined in Tables 
3 and 4. Considered manager characteristics include SAT Score: the composite SAT score from the U.S. News and World 
Report and Princeton Review and Work Experience: the number of years the manager as worked. Fund characteristics 
considered include: Fund Age: the number of years since fund inception, Fund Return and Fund Return Standard Deviation 
measured using monthly returns in the prior year, Fund Size measured by total net assets (TNA), Fund Flow calculated as 
(TNAi,t – TNAi,t-1 × (1+Ri,t))/TNAi,t-1 where TNA is total net assets to fund i at the end of year t and R is fund return, Initial 
Investment: the minimum investment required to initially invest in the fund, Leverage Indicator: an indicator variable equal 
to one if the fund uses leverage in its positions, annual management and incentive fee and the number of days in the lockup, 
redemption and subscription periods and an indicator variable equal to one if the fund has a high water mark provision to 
charge the incentive fee, average return and flow to funds in the same style as fund i, and indicator variables equal to 1 if the 
fund is still active or open to new investment at year-end 2010. Standardized regression coefficient values are reported with 
associated t-statistics reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by fund family and the models include style and 









Performance and Dynamic Systematic Risk Management 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Alpha (%) 
Full Sample  DEF Partitions  Skill Partitions  
 







Equity Risk St. Dev.t-1 -0.11
*
   -0.12
**





 (1.82)  (2.69) (1.70)  (2.39) (2.76)  
Size Spread St. Dev.t-1 -0.03  -0.02 -0.04  -0.04 -0.04  
 (0.91)  (0.40) (1.02)  (0.70) (0.54)  
Bond Risk St. Dev.t-1 0.04  0.03 0.04  0.03 0.04  
 (0.68)  (0.35) (0.74)  (0.56) (1.00)  









 (2.37)  (2.14) (2.01)  (2.29) (2.53)  










 (4.37) (2.35)  




     
 
(4.33)  (2.34) (5.46)     
Correlation Riskt-1 -0.05  -0.07 -0.01   -0.09
*
 -0.02  
 
(1.17)  (1.70) (0.70)  (1.93) (0.39)  
Correlation Risk St. Deviation t-1  -0.14
**










(2.70)  (2.70) (2.97)  (3.12) (2.13)  
Controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Adjusted R
2
 26.95  27.74 25.12  29.23 23.36  
Sum of Factor Std. Coef. -0.22   -0.28 -0.12  -0.17 -0.29  
Skill or abs. Systematic Risk Coef. 0.32    0.18  0.43   0.34  0.12  
Sum  0.10
**









t-statistic (2.15)   (1.91) (3.87)  (2.85) (2.83)  
Number of observations 2,825  972 442  619 2,206  
This table reports time-series regression results of hedge fund alpha estimates on factor loading volatility, systematic 
risk or systematic risk management skill and correlation risk. The dependent variable is the annual fund alpha 
calculated using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7 factor model. Systematic risk is calculated as previously defined using 
the PC10 model (equation (1)) and systematic risk management skill as is defined in Table 5. Equity Risk St. Dev., 
Size Spread St. Dev, Bond Risk St. Dev and Credit Risk St. Dev. are the standard deviation of hedge fund return 
loading on each risk factor. Factor loadings are calculated annually and the standard deviation is calculated over 
three year windows. Market condition and manager skill partitions are calculated as defined in Table 5. The fund 
characteristic variables considered in Table 5 are included in each model as controls, but are suppressed in the 
interest of brevity. In each model standard errors are clustered by fund family and year and style fixed effects are 
included. Standardized coefficient estimates are reported with associated t-statistics reported in parentheses. In the 
weak and strong market models, coefficient pairs that are statistically different from each other appear in bold face. 













Investor Sensitivity to Dynamic Systematic Risk Management 
 




 DEF  Skill 
   Weak Strong  
High Low 
   Market Market  











 (2.17)  (2.38) (1.99)  (2.03) (3.68) 
Size Spread St. Dev.t-1 0.06  0.05 0.05  0.05 0.06 
 (1.40)  (1.53) (1.03)  (0.86) (0.68) 
Bond Risk St. Dev.t-1 0.02  0.02 0.03  0.01 0.04 
 (0.42)  (0.99) (0.83)  (0.37) (1.21) 











 (1.75)  (2.19) (1.75)  (1.95) (2.02) 







   
  
 (3.30) (2.05) 
SR Management Skillt-1  0.28
***




    
 (3.97)  (3.20) (5.36)    
Correlation Riskt-1 -0.07  -0.07 -0.07  -0.05 -0.09
*
 
 (1.33)  (1.58) (1.67)  (1.26) (1.85) 
Correlation Risk St. Deviation t-1 -0.12
*
  -0.10  -0.13
**





 (1.78)  (1.49) (2.56)  (2.54) (1.88) 
Controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 28.58  24.86 30.07  30.75 25.95 
Sum of Factor Std. Coef. -0.10  -0.16 -0.06  -0.09 -0.14 
Skill or abs. Systematic Risk Coef. 0.28  0.17 0.41  0.24 0.09 
Sum  0.18
***
  0.01  0.35
***
   0.15
**
 -0.04 
t-statistic (2.81)  (0.39) (4.50)  (2.44) (1.21) 
Number of observations 2,825  972 442  619 2,206 
This table reports time-series panel regression results of hedge fund flow related to hedge fund systematic and 
correlation risk. All independent variable are as previously defined. The fund characteristic variables considered in 
Table 5 are included in each model as controls, but are suppressed in the interest of brevity. In each model standard 
errors are clustered by fund family and year and style fixed effects are included. Standardized coefficient estimates 
are reported with associated t-statistics reported in parentheses. In the weak and strong market models, coefficient 














Fig. 1 This figure shows the proportion of the hedge fund sample that changes its systematic risk quintile rank by 
year. Proportions are reported for three groups; 1) funds which maintain the same quintile rank from the prior year 
(ΔQ=0), 2) funds which increase or decrease their quintile rank by one position (absΔQ=1) and 3) funds which 
increase or decrease their quintile ranks by more than one position (absΔQ<1). Systematic risk quintile ranks are 
formed separately across the entire sample and within each year. Systematic risk is calculated as previously defined 





























Ranks Formed over Entire Sample 




















Ranks Formed by Year 
No Rank Change Change Rank by 1 Change Rank by more than 1
